Tuesday, December 17, 2019

The s Falsification Principle For Demarcating Science...

Adam Leuer Prof. Livengood PHIL 471 16 May 2015 Against Popper’s Falsificationism In the following pages I will argue that Karl Popper’s falsification principle, when used as the criterion for demarcating science from non-science, cannot in all cases establish definitively whether a theory is scientific, and thus at the very least cannot be the sole method of distinguishing science from non-science. My argument is as follows: For any criterion to serve as the principle of demarkation, it must describe how, for any given hypothesis, that hypothesis can be evaluated as scientific or not. Furthermore, that procedure should be consistent with the way established â€Å"good† science is done in practice. Popper’s falsification principle is, in at least a few cases, inconsistent with the way science is done in practice. Therefore, falsification cannot serve as the principle of demarkation. It has long been the project of philosophers to elucidate just what it is that makes a method of inquiry science. The question is this: how can we tell if a theory , or set of theories, constitutes science? What is the principle by which a claim about the nature of things can be said to be scientific? And just as importantly, how can we know what sort of things are not? Popper attempted to answer this question of demarkation between science and non-science by proposing a criterion for distinguishing the former from the latter. Falsifiability, he claimed, is what makes a hypothesis scientific. To sayShow MoreRelatedThe Limitations of Falsificationism1713 Words   |  7 PagesChalmers, chapter 7:ï ¿ ½ The Limitations of Falsificationism Problems stemming from the logical situation (87) Recap: the ï ¿ ½logical pointï ¿ ½ in favour of falsificationism over inductionism is that, while no finite number of observation sentences will prove a general claim, one single observation sentence will disprove it.ï ¿ ½ BUT: 1. 1. Falsificationists accept theory-dependence (and hence, fallibility) of observation sentences, therefore the observation sentence can be rejected instead of the theory

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